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An important but empirically debated issue in spatial economics is whether spatial dif-
ferences in unemployment reect residential sorting on invidividual characteristics or a true
e¤ect of location. We investigate this issue in the 1,300 French muncipalities that constitute
the Paris region and across which there is overwhelming evidence of spatial disparities in un-
employment durations. We resort to a methodology that enables us to disentangle individual
and unspecied local e¤ects. In order to control for individual determinants, we estimate a
proportional hazard model stratied by municipality using an exhaustive dataset of all un-
employment spells starting in the rst semester of 1996. This model allows us to recover a
survival function for each municipality that is purged of individual observed heterogeneity.
We show that only around 30% of the disparities in the observed determinants of the survival
rates relate to individual variables. Nearly 70% of the remaining disparities are captured by
local indicators which we show to be mainly correlated with local measures of residential
segregation. We are also able to show that local and individual characteristics reinforce one
another in their contribution to spatial disparities in unemployment duration.
Keywords: Unemployment, Duration models, Economic geography, Urban economics.
JEL Codes: C41, J64, R23
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1 Introduction
The determinants of urban unemployment have raised the interest of economists for decades. In
the US, two major trends of literature have tried to explain how location could have an adverse
impact on employment, involving a variety of mechanisms. The rst set of works is the so-called
spatial mismatch literature which investigates how the physical disconnection from jobs can ex-
acerbate unemployment among low-skilled minority workers (see Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998,
for an empirical survey, and Gobillon, Selod and Zenou, 2007, for a theoretical one). The second
set of works investigates the impact of residential segregation on the poor labor-market outcomes
of ghetto residents (see e.g. Wilson, 1996, Cutler and Glaeser, 1997). In both literatures, papers
usually resort to cross-section methods and try to explain individual unemployment probabilities
or local unemployment rates (see e.g. Ihlanfeldt, 1993, Conley and Topa, 2002, Weinberg, 2000
and 2004).
In this paper, we focus on the local determinants of unemployment duration. Only a few
papers, mainly on the US, have studied unemployment dynamics at the individual level with
a spatial perspective (Holzer, Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1994, Rogers, 1997, Dawkins, Shen and
Sanchez, 2005, Johnson, 2006). In these works, authors usually investigate the impact of local
indicators proxying for spatial mismatch or residential segregation in an unemployment duration
model. They typically estimate a proportional hazard model with a single baseline hazard common
to all locations, a set of individual variables and local indicators. We adopt a much broader
approach that consists in estimating a baseline hazard function for each location while controlling
for individual characteristics in a proportional hazard model. This key methodological innovation,
known as the Stratied Partial Likelihood Estimator (SPLE), was rst proposed by Ridder and
Tunali (1999) in another context. We apply it in this paper to a large administrative dataset
containing records of unemployment spells and adapt it to include some new econometric features.
Compared to the previous literature, the advantages of our empirical strategy are threefold.
First, we do not need to choose a specic function for the local hazard functions. We can thus
measure the overall e¤ects of location without only focusing on a few arbitrarily selected mech-
anisms, proxied by criticizable local indicators. Second, we allow the e¤ect of location to vary
depending on the time spent unemployed. We can thus assess the e¤ect of location on the short
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run (say, after 6 months) and on the long run (say, after two years). Third, the model is su¢ ciently
versatile to allow us to further restrict local hazard rates while controling for the generality of
these restrictions.
The estimation procedure has three steps. The rst step consists in estimating a proportional
hazard model with an unspecied municipality-specic hazard baseline hazard. In the second
step of the estimation procedure, we impose that the municipality e¤ects are multiplicative in the
hazard rate. This multiplicative component model summarizes the local e¤ects through a single
indicator. In the third stage, we assess how this local indicator may capture local determinants
reecting the di¤erent mechanisms put forward by the literature. This is done by regressing mu-
nicipality e¤ects on these variables and computing their explanatory power. We do not interpret
this last stage as a causal regression because omitted variable or reverse causality concerns can-
not be dismissed. Our procedure however ensures that the previous stages are immune to these
endogeneity issues so that we can separate the robust estimation of local e¤ects from less robust
results obtained in the third stage.
Yet, we cannot easily deal with individual unobserved heterogeneity in our proportional haz-
ard specication. This is in line with Baker and Melino (2000)s nding that identication of both
exible hazard rates and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is fragile in empirical stud-
ies. Moreover, individual unobserved heterogeneity like, for instance, omitted variables related to
preferences, is partially captured since we model the hazard rate function at the level of the mu-
nicipality. Furthermore, we apply goodness of t test procedures under the form of a Kolmogorov
statistic as developed in Andrews (1997) and show that the model ts the data very well at the
level of each municipality.
Our approach requires a very large dataset comprising enough unemployment spells in each
location. We use a unique exhaustive administrative dataset available for the Paris region from
which we extract unemployment spells that started in the rst semester of 1996. Unemployment
spells can end in three di¤erent ways: nding a job, dropping out of the labor force, and right-
censorship (including exits for unknown reasons). We model the rst two exits in an independent
competing risk framework.
Our main empirical results are as follows. We nd that controling for individual characteristics
explains around 30% of the spatial disparities across municipalities in unemployment durations
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until nding a job. Among the main individual determinants of unemployment duration as educa-
tion, it should be stressed that some nationalities, Africans in particular, experience signicantly
much larger durations until nding a job. Furthermore, the association between average individ-
ual characteristics at the municipality level and baseline hazards is positive. Presumably because
of sorting e¤ects, individual and local e¤ects reinforce each other in their contribution to spatial
disparities of unemployment duration. In other words, durations are not only larger because of
an adverse individual characteristic but also because the average of this adverse characteristic is
larger at the local level. Finally, nearly 70% of the remaining local disparities are captured by
local indicators, mainly segregation indices.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide a short survey of the
litterature on how segregation and bad physical accessibility to jobs can increase unemployment
duration. Section 3 presents the data and a selection of descriptive statistics to measure spatial
disparities. Section 4 details the SPLE method. Section 5 discusses the results. Finally, section 6
concludes.
2 Why should location inuence unemployment duration?
The duration of unemployment depends on many factors. To discuss this issue in an orderly
manner, it is useful to adopt a job-search perspective considering that exit from unemployment
can occur at the end of a three-stage process. In the rst stage, workers must wait some time
before coming into contact with a job opportunity. In the second stage, an o¤er from an employer
may materialize. Finally, workers may accept or reject the o¤er depending on whether the o¤ered
wage is greater or smaller than their reservation wage. With this framework in mind, job seekers
who, on average, wait long before experiencing contacts with employers and who have few chances
to transform their contacts into o¤ers and matches should experience long unemployment spells.
For instance, educated workers could be advantaged in the rst stage if they are more e¢ cient in
obtaining information about jobs and in contacting rms, or if labor demand is biased in their
favor. They may also have an advantage in the second stage if they write better application letters
and resumes, and fare better during interviews. However, educated workers may be more likely
to reject an o¤er when they face or anticipate many well-paid outside o¤ers. Other individual
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and family characteristics such as gender, race/ethnicity, age, experience, marital status or the
number and age of children and dependants should also be expected to a¤ect unemployment
duration through one or several stages of the job-acquisition process.
This section describes how location, i.e. the disconnection from job opportunities (in cases
where job opportunities are unevenly distributed within a metropolitan area) and/or residential
segregation (in terms of education, race/ethnicity/nationality or employment status), can also
inuence the duration of unemployment. We decompose the e¤ects on each stage of the job-
acquisition process.
Disconnection from job opportunities may directly a¤ect the time spent searching for a job in
the rst stage of the process. Indeed, job-seekers residing in areas with few local job vacancies or
in areas located far away from employment centers are exposed only to a small pool of vacancies.
Residing in loose local labor markets, they should spend more time searching before getting into
contact with a potential employer. Of course, job-seekers also have the possibility to search for
jobs in other areas. But having to search away from ones area of residence penalizes job seekers.
At least three reasons may come into view. Firstly, because of informational frictions, job-seekers
may not search e¢ ciently far away from their residences. For instance, workers residing far away
from job opportunities may not hear about job o¤ers when rms resort to recruiting methods that
favor the local labor force (i.e. by posting wantedsigns in retail shops, or by choosing not to
publicize job o¤ers beyond a certain distance). Alternatively, job-seekers may obtain only partial
information on the location of distant jobs or may have only a vague idea about the types of jobs
o¤ered in parts of the metropolitan area they are not familiar with. They may end up searching
in the wrong places (Ihlanfeldt, 1997, Stoll and Raphael, 2000). Secondly, because search is costly,
workers may restrict their search horizon at the vicinity of their neighborhood. They may search
less often in order to reduce the number of job-search trips or may not search at all for jobs
located in distant places. In this context, access to public transport or car ownership can reduce
job-search costs and expand the job-search horizon (Stoll, 1999). Thirdly, the individual search
e¤ort may depend on the local cost of living so that workers residing in areas disconnected from
job opportunities may not search intensively. It has been argued that workers residing in such
areas usually incur low housing costs and thus may feel relatively little less pressure to actively
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search for a job in order to pay their rent (Smith and Zenou, 2003, Pattachini and Zenou, 2006).
Disconnection from job opportunities may also reduce the frequency of job proposals in the
second stage. Employers may then be reluctant to propose jobs to distant workers because com-
muting long distances would make these workers less productive (they would show up late or be
tired due to excessive commuting, see Zenou, 2002).
Distance to job opportunities may also reduce the probability of a job acceptance in the third
stage. Indeed, workers may reject a job o¤er that would involve commutes that are too long if
commuting to that job would be too costly in view of the proposed wage (Zax and Kain, 1996).
In other words, distance is likely to make the o¤ered wage net of commuting costs drop below a
workers given reservation wage.
The e¤ect of residential segregation on the rst stage of the job-acquisition process is also
likely to be harmful to the extent that job contacts often occur through friends and relatives
(Mortensen and Vishwanath, 1994). Because social networks are at least partly localized, when the
unemployment rate is high in a given area, workers are less likely to know employed neighbors that
can let them know about existing vacancies (Calvó and Jackson, 2004, Selod and Zenou, 2006).
Residential segregation is also likely to reduce the probability for a worker residing in a segre-
gated area to receive a job o¤er. This is because employers may discriminate against residentially
segregated workers, a practice known as redlining (see Wilson, 1996, for stories of rms not hiring
workers located in badneighborhoods). For employers, the motivation can hinge upon the stigma
or prejudice associated with the residential location of candidates (sheer discrimination), or be-
cause they consider that, on average, workers from stigmatized areas have bad work habits or are
more likely to be criminal (statistical discrimination). In industries and jobs in which workers are
in contact with customers, employers may discriminate against residentially-segregated workers
in order to satisfy the perceived prejudices of their clients, a practice known as customer discrim-
ination (Holzer and Ihlanfeldt, 1998). In France, the issue of redlining is increasingly being put
forward in the public debate to account for the unemployment of the young adults that reside in
distressed areas. To our knowledge, however, the issue has not yet been studied empirically.
All these economic mechanisms suggest that the rate at which workers leave unemployment,
and thus the duration of unemployment, depends on both individual characteristics and local
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features. In the present paper, we propose a methodology to disentangle individual and unspecied
local e¤ects. We explore the nature of local e¤ects by regressing them on indices of segregation
and distance to job opportunities. We assess the overall impact of these indices on nding a job,
but we do not try to identify through which specic mechanisms they percolate.
3 Description of the Data
3.1 The area of study
The paper focuses on the Ile-de-France region (the Paris region hereafter), an administrative unit
of 10.9 million inhabitants distributed over 1,280 municipalities centered around the city of Paris
and the 20 administrative subdistricts of Paris (which will be treated as municipalities in the
analysis). These 1,300 spatial units may have very di¤erent population sizes which range from
225,000 in the most populous Parisian subdistrict to small villages located some 80 km away from
the center of Paris. They correspond more or less to the Paris Metropolitan Area as can be seen
from Graph 1 which represents the population density in each municipality.
[Insert Graph 1]
Graph 2 provides evidence that the studied area exhibits large spatial disparities in the local
unemployment rates across municipalities. In particular, the unemployment rates in municipalities
located to the North-East of Paris are more than four times higher than in most municipalities
located to the West.
[Insert Graph 2]
3.2 The ANPE historical le
We use the historical le of job applicants to the National Agency for Employment (Agence
Nationale pour lEmploi or ANPE hereafter) for the Paris region to study spatial disparities in
unemployment durations. This database provides a quasi-exhaustive list of unemployment spells
in the region as it has been estimated that 90% of job seekers in France are indeed registered
with the ANPE (Chardon and Goux, 2003). The reason is that registering with the ANPE is
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a prerequisite for unemployment workers to be able to claim their unemployment benets. A
signicant share of those not eligible for unemployment benets as for instance rst time job
seekers also register with the ANPE to assist them in their job search.
The ANPE is organized in hundreds of local agencies and unemployed workers register in the
agency closest to their residence.1 The exhaustive dataset that we have for the Paris region contains
information on the exact date of an application (the very day), the unemployment duration (in
days), and the reason for which the application came to an end. Along with the municipality
where the individual lives and registers, a set of socio-economic characteristics were reported
upon registration with the employment agency: age, gender, nationality, diploma, marital status,
number of children and disabilities. To build our working sample, we select individuals who applied
to the employment agency between January 1 and June 30, 1996 and who lived in the Paris region
at that time. As we have information on unemployment spells until 2003, starting as early as 1996
enables us to follow unemployed workers over a long period of time and to minimize the number of
incomplete spells due to the end of the observation period (which only concerns 0:6% of the exits
in our sample. After deleting the very few observations for which socio-economic characteristics
are missing, we end up with 430; 695 observations on individual unemployment durations. More
details on the construction and the contents of the dataset are given in Appendix A.
We group the reasons given for the termination of the application with the agency into three
types: (1) nding a job, (2) exiting to non-employment, and (3) right censoring, which groups
together unknown destinations and incomplete spells.2 In the following, we assume that right-
censoring is independent of the durations until exiting to a job or non-employment and that these
two exits are independent, conditional on all observed characteristics including the municipality of
residence. A large proportion of exits are right-censored (55:3%), of which 29:5% correspond to an
1Except in very specic occupations (artists, ...).
2An exit to non-employment covers the following situations: a training period, an illness, a pregnancy, a job
accident (as some unemployed workers can in fact work for a very small number of hours), an exemption from the
rule imposing to actively search for a job, retirement, or military service. Unknown destinations can result from
mobility between four subregions (see text below), an absence at a control, an expulsion for some misbehavior, an
absence after a notication, a training or job refusal, a fake statement, the lack of a positive action to search for a
job, and other unspecied cases.
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absence at a control.3 The remaining unemployment spells mostly end up with a job (28%) even
if exit to non-employment is far from negligible (16:7%). The average unemployment duration for
individuals nding a job is 269 days whereas it stands at a higher level of 368 days for individuals
who exit to non-employment. The higher unemployment duration for exits to non-employment
could possibly reect the discouragement of workers that could not nd a job after a long time.
A crucial issue in this data arises because residential mobility across municipalities could blur
our estimation of spatial disparities. In particular, because mobility can change the way unem-
ployment spells are recorded, it could give rise to (i) right and left censoring, to (ii) measurement
errors of local e¤ects, and (iii) to departures from the independence assumption because of right
censoring. To see how these issues may emerge and why we believe, however, that they may be
relatively minor, consider the following lines of reasoning:
First, the French Employment Agency is organized geographically in large subregions called
ASSEDIC and when residential mobility brings about a change in ASSEDIC, the unemployment
spell is right-censored and a (mistakenly fresh) spell is started in the new ASSEDIC. The unem-
ployment spell is thus cut into two halves, the rst spell being right censored, and the second spell
being left-censored. Fortunately, there are only 4 ASSEDIC located in the Paris region (West,
East, South-East and Paris) and in our date only 4.83% of unemployed workers change ASSEDIC
as stated in the reasons for exits. Moreover, double counting is also mitigated by the fact that we
consider a ow-sampling window of only six months starting at the beginning of 1996.
Second, even if mobility takes place within the same ASSEDIC, it might bring a change in
municipality and local agency. Although the spell is registered as uninterrupted, the stated place
of residence may either correspond to that recorded at the origin or at the destination agency.4
Yet, measurement errors of local e¤ects, if anything, would likely attenuate our measures of spatial
disparities.
3There is no evidence that these absences would mainly concern unemployed workers that neglected to report
they found a job. Indeed, a 2005 follow-up survey on a small random sample of unemployed workers having left the
ANPE showed that only approximately half of absentees at controls did nd a job, which is not in contradiction
with the assumption of independence between right censoring and nding a job.
4The administrative treatment by ANPE of spells which ended in a local agency di¤erent from the one where
it started is very obscure. The two spells are registered and one of them is deleted apparently without following
any precise written rule.
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Finally, in many aspects, the mobility decision could be partly independent of exiting to a job
or to non-employment. For instance, the prospect of saving money by living with ones parents
might be an exogenous factor conditional on the individual and local e¤ects. On the other hand,
mobility is clearly endogenous if a job seeker moves with the prospect of waiting until nding a
job near the new location. Given that mobility is low in France with respect to the US (Baccaini,
Courgeau and Desplanques, 1993), we believe that these issues have second order e¤ects compared
to the main substantive e¤ects of infrastructure, redlining or discrimination to which we now turn.
3.3 Spatial disparities
The Paris region exhibits stark socio-economic disparities which can broadly be depicted as follows.
In the North-East, the population is usually little educated, poor, and composed of blue collar
workers. Recent migrant minorities are over-represented. In the West, the population is very
educated, rich, and comprises mostly white collars. Minorities of recent immigration waves are
under-represented.
To further characterize disparities across municipalities and di¤erences in municipality environ-
ments, we compute municipality-specic segregation and job-accessibility variables using several
sources.
3.3.1 Census measures of segregation and job accessibility
Segregation is accounted for by the municipality proportion of education and nationality groups
computed from the 1999 Population Census. Job accessibility is measured by the job density
around each municipality. More precisely, for each municipality we are able to identify all the
other municipalities than can be reached within 45 minutes for a given transport mode (private
vehicles or public transport). The 45-minute cut-o¤ has been chosen just above the average
commuting time of 34 minutes in the Paris region (DREIF-INSEE, 1997). This denes a group of
accessible municipalities for which we can calculate the overall job density (the ratio of the number
of jobs located in the area to the number of occupied and unoccupied workers residing in the same
area).5 Data on the location of jobs and workers are from the 1999 census. Travel times between
5For a discussion of alternative indicators see Gobillon and Selod (2007).
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municipalities are estimated at morning peak hours by the French Department of Transportation
for 2000 using a transport survey on the Paris region (Enquête Générale des Transports).
We compute indices of spatial disparities on these local segregation and job-accessibility vari-
ables. The indices we compute are the inter-decile ratio, the inter-decile range, the Gini index and
the coe¢ cient of variation, and results are reported in Table 1.6 We nd that spatial disparities
across muncipalities are very pronounced for the percentage of African nationalities as the inter-
decile ratio is over 9 for the percentages of citizens from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa.
This means that the frequency of African citizens is 9 times larger in municipalities at the 9th
decile than at the rst. Spatial disparities are also large for segregation in terms of education
and stands near 4 for the percentage of individuals with a university degree and around 2:5 for
the percentage of individuals with a technical degree. Measures of job accessibility also exhibit
signicant spatial disparities. The inter-decile ratio for job densities by public transport is 3.
[Insert Table 1]
3.3.2 Spatial Disparities for the Unemployed
Spatial disparities in the characteristics of unemployed workers also exhibit a similar pattern over
the Paris region. Table 2 reports similar indices of spatial disparities across municipalities for
several variables of the ANPE historical le. We measure the spatial disparities in the occurrence
of exit types, the unemployment duration conditionally on the type of exit, and the individual
variables that we use in our empirical analysis below. As with the census data, the indices we
compute are the inter-decile ratio, the inter-decile range, the Gini index and the coe¢ cient of
variation.
We rst comment the spatial disparities in the proportions of individuals who respectively
experience an exit to a job, an exit to non-employment, and right-censoring. For simplicity, we
restrict our comments to the inter-decile ratio but other indicators give qualitatively similar results.
The inter-decile ratio is fairly large for the probability that unemployment nishes with an exit to
6To compute the spatial inter-decile index of a variable, we construct the empirical distribution function of the
local average of the variable. Observations are weighted by the population in each municipality. We smooth the
empirical distribution by a Gaussian kernel with a Silvermans rule of thumb bandwidth and deciles are retrieved
using a very ne grid (1; 000; 000 points).
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a job as it reaches 1:73. This means that, if we order municipalities with respect to the proportion
of unemployment spells ending with an exit to a job, an unemployment spell has 73 percent more
chances to end with an exit to a job in the municipality at the ninth decile than in the municipality
at the rst decile. The inter-decile ratio is smaller for the probability of an exit to non-employment
(1:37) and for right-censoring (1:32). These variations in spatial disparities across exit types calls
for a careful conditioning on local e¤ects.
If we now look at unemployment durations conditionally on the type of exit, the inter-decile
ratio for unemployment spells ending with an exit to a job reaches 1:37. This means that an
unemployment spell ending with an exit to a job lasts 37 percent longer in the municipality at the
ninth decile than in the municipality at the rst decile. For unemployment spells ending with an
exit to non-employment, the inter-decile ratio is even greater and stands at 1:43.
[Insert Table 2]
As the above data is right-censored because of exits to other states, these statistics are di¢ cult to
interpret. This is why we also assess disparities between municipalities with the help of duration
models. For each type of exit and for each municipality, we compute the Kaplan-Meier estimator
of the survival function (which takes into account right-censorship). Disparities by exit type can
then be assessed by comparing the survival function across municipalities for any chosen duration.
As survival functions are well estimated only when the number of unemployed workers is large
enough, we restrict our attention to municipalities with a population greater than 5,000 inhabitants
in 1999. Graph 3 represents the probability of nding a job before 24 months for each municipality
of the Paris region. Disparities are large: the probability of nding a job before 24 months is below
40% in many municipalities of the North-East, whereas it is above 55% in many municipalities
of the West. Graph 4 represents the probability of exiting to non-employment before 24 months
for each municipality. Contrary to the graph for exit to a job, no specic pattern emerges. This
contrast suggests that while job search outcomes strongly depend on location, this is less the case
for labor-market participation decisions.
[Insert Graph 3 and 4]
There are also noticeable spatial disparities in some of the socio-demographic characteristics of
unemployed workers. Whereas the spatial disparities in age, sex or marital status are small (see
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Table 2), there are much larger disparities for some categories of nationality, education, and
family size, as well as for disability. The inter-decile ratio for instance is greater than 5 for the
proportion of Africans. In other words, the proportion of Africans among unemployed workers in
municipalities at the ninth decile is 5 times greater than in municipalities at the rst decile. The
inter-decile ratio is above 5 for unemployed workers having three children or more, around 4 for
unemployed workers with no diploma, and above 2:5 for disabled unemployed workers.
In conclusion, spatial disparities of individual characteristics are large. Results in Tables 1
and 2 are hard to compare, data sources being so di¤erent. Likely origins of di¤erences between
them could be reporting errors and composition e¤ects although we did not investigate the point
further. It very much depends on the spatial disparities in entries into unemployment which we
are not in a position to assess using the data that are available to us.
4 The econometric model
We analyze the empirical associations between unemployment durations and the local context
(segregation and job accessibility) using a three-stage procedure. First, we specify a proportional
hazard model (PH model hereafter) with individual covariates and a municipality-specic baseline
hazard. Parameters related to individual variables are estimated using the stratied partial likeli-
hood estimator (SPLE hereafter) as proposed by Ridder and Tunali (1999). Municipality-specic
integrated baseline hazards are then recovered using the Breslow estimator. Second, municipal
baseline hazards are restricted to be a multiplicative function of an aggregate baseline hazard
function and of municipality e¤ects which are both estimated using the rst-stage outputs. A
third and nal descriptive stage consists in regressing the municipality e¤ects on local indicators
of segregation (municipality composition) and job accessibility.
Our approach can be justied as follows. The rst two stages allow to estimate municipality e¤ects.
For computational reasons, this would be unfeasible by maximum likelihood estimation in one stage
only since the number of municipalities (1; 300) is too large. The nal stage consists in regressing
those municipality e¤ects on aggregate variables. It enables us to analyse the correlation between
spatial e¤ects and segregation or job accessibility indices, although we do not claim to estimate
causal e¤ects in the last stage. Our procedure in three steps guards us against specication errors
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at each stage. First stage estimates are robust to misspecication of the multiplicative model and
of the descriptive regression of municipality e¤ects. Second stage estimates are robust to errors
at the descriptive regression stage. Furthermore, all steps contribute to the empirical analysis of
spatial disparities in unemployment durations.
4.1 Model Specication
Consider an individual i who enters unemployment (i.e. who enters the ANPE le). His unem-
ployment spell lasts until he nds a job (exit labeled e) or drops out of the labor force (exit labeled
ne). The unemployment spell is right-censored if the individual disappears from the records dur-
ing the observation period or has not experienced an exit before the last day of observation in the
panel. A latent duration Tk is associated with each exit k 2 fe; neg. For an individual i, we denote
k ( jXi; j(i)) the conditional hazard rate for exit k where Xi is a set of individual explanatory
variables  that are xed over time in our application  and j (i) ; where j(i) 2 f1; :::; Jg ; is
the municipality where the individual is located. We adopt the proportional hazard assumption
separating the e¤ect of individual characteristics and the e¤ect of local clusters by writing:
k (t jXi; j(i)) = j(i)k (t) exp (Xik) for k 2 fe; neg ; (1)
where jk (t) is the baseline hazard rate function for municipality j and exit k. Observe that the
e¤ect of local variables is not of the proportional hazard type at this stage since the municipality-
specic baseline hazard rate is fully exible. Additionally, the two latent durations and right-
censorship are assumed to be independent so that our framework is an independent competing
risk model where observations are clustered.
Observe also that the above specication features come at the expense of overlooking unob-
served individual heterogeneity whose presence can bias the estimation of the hazard rates and
parameters. Latent durations associated with di¤erent types of exit might also be dependent if
the e¤ect of individual unobserved heterogeneity inuencing the di¤erent types of exit are cor-
related. Lancaster (1990) proposes to introduce individual unobserved heterogeneity in a partial
likelihood model by modeling it as a gamma distribution and to estimate parameters using an
EM algorithm. Yet, the procedure is burdensome and unfeasible in samples where the number of
observations is as large as in ours. An alternative way to proceed would be to di¤erence out indi-
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vidual unobserved terms using multiple spells. In theory, this could be done by redening clusters
as couples (municipality, individual) but the number of applicants appearing twice or more is very
small (about 8%) and the issue about biases caused by residential mobility could then become
serious. Also note that Baker and Melino (2000) argue that it is di¢ cult to empirically identify
the unobserved heterogeneity distribution and exible hazard rates, and that in the current appli-
cation, the hazards are fully exible at the municipality levels. For all these reasons, we decided
not to incorporate individual unobserved heterogeneity in our econometric specication (1). We
nevertheless discuss below the consequences of its presence on our empirical results. Specically,
we will pay attention to the e¤ects of the sorting of individuals across municipalities according to
their unobserved characteristics.
4.2 Stratied Partial Likelihood Estimation (SPLE)
Our estimation follows Ridder and Tunali (1999). Start with the estimation of the e¤ects of
individual explanatory variables using the SPLE. Denote 
j (t) the set of individuals at risk of
exiting unemployment in municipality j at time t. The probability of individual i experiencing
a type-k exit at time t conditionally on someone in the same municipality experiencing a type-k
exit is:7






Observe that conditioning on the municipality population at risk (instead of the whole population
at risk) makes all municipality-specic baseline hazards cancel out so that we do not need to
specify its functional form. The stratied partial likelihood function (calculated on all unemployed








7This formula is exact only when time is continuous. In our data where time is expressed in days, several
individuals may exit the same day and it is impossible to order them depending on their time of exit. Nevertheless,
following Breslow (1974), we consider (2) as an approximation of the conditional probability of exit. In practice,
when an individual exits a given day, the risk set includes all the other individuals who exit the same day.
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where ti is the time of exit of individual i, ki is the type of exit of individual i, and Lk (k) =

ijki=k
Pi (ti; ki) is constructed from all unemployment spells that end with a type-k exit. Lk (k) is
the partial likelihood obtained in the hypothetical context where there is only one possible exit k
and where unemployment spells are censored if they end up with the other exit. Notice that each
set of parameters k can be separately estimated by maximizing the corresponding term Lk under
the independent competing risks assumption. Denote bk the estimator.
We can now turn to the estimation of the municipality baseline hazard function. For exit k,
the Breslow estimator of the integrated baseline hazard of municipality j, jk (t), is dened as:
bjk (t) = tZ
0
I (Cj (s) > 0)P
i2
j(s)
exp(Xibk)dN jk (s) ; (4)
where I () is the indicator function, Cj (s) = card 
j (s), and dN jk (s) is a dummy that equals
one if someone in municipality j experiences a type k-exit in an arbitrarily short period of time
before date s (and zero otherwise). For each t, the variance of bjk (t) can be recovered from Ridder
and Tunalis formulas.8
4.3 Estimation of Spatial E¤ects
In the second stage, for each type of exit, we estimate municipality e¤ects that summarize the
municipality-specic baseline hazard rates by a single quantity. This is a restriction of the general
model. Since the estimation procedure can be applied to each type of exit separately, we restrict
our attention to a given exit k and drop subscript k for readability. It should be kept in mind that
all parameters analyzed below are exit-specic.
We assume that the municipality-specic baseline hazard rates take a multiplicative form:
j (t) = j (t) (5)
where j is a municipality xed e¤ect and  (t) is a general baseline hazard function. Here, we
depart from Ridder and Tunali who adopt an additive form. Indeed, we nd it more natural to use
8This can be done using their equations A25, A27 and A29 and setting K = 1, t0 = 0 and t1 = T in their
equation (22).
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a multiplicative specication since, when combining (1) and (5), we obtain a proportional hazard
model where spatial e¤ects enter multiplicatively. This is presumably quite restrictive though
worth investigating.
Instead of directly implementing the functional estimation of (5), we divide the period [0;1)
into M intervals whose lower (resp. upper) bound is tm 1 (resp. tm), for m = 1; :::;M (where
t0 = 0 and tM = 1). If we denote m =
tmR
tm 1
 (s) ds the increment of the integrated aggregate
baseline hazard over the interval m, the increment of the integrated baseline hazard rate over a
time interval m in a municipality j is given by
yjm = 
j (tm) j (tm 1) = jm:
An estimate of the average hazard rate yjm can be constructed from equation (4) and is:
9
y^jm =
bj (tm)  bj (tm 1) :
Using equation (5), we can now set up the estimated model as a minimum distance problem (or









+ ln (m) + "
j
m (6)
where "jm = ln (y^
j
m)   ln (yjm) is the residual due to the sampling variability of estimated hazard
rates (see Appendix B.2.2 for the computation of the covariance matrix).
There are two statistical issues of importance. First, note that (6) is ill-dened when byjm takes
the value zero. This happens when there is no exit of type k in municipality j in the time interval
[tm 1; tm]. Corresponding observations are ignored in the estimation. It is a small sample issue that
can be safely ignored if the number of observations is large as in most municipalities. In practice,
there is a trade-o¤between small sample biases and precision when choosing the intervals. Trading
o¤ optimally bias and precision by constructing optimal data-driven intervals is out of the scope
of this paper.
Second, equation (6) is a two-component model that can be estimated using weighted least squares
where the weights are given by the square root of the inverse of the covariance matrix of residuals
"jm. However, this minimum distance estimator is known to perform badly in small samples as
9Dealing with the last interval is specic and detailed in the Appendix B.2.1.
18
shown by Altonji and Segal (1996).10We chose to use a slight modication of their equally weighted
estimator which is simpler and better behaved. We simply weigh the estimation by the number of
unemployed workers at risk at the beginning of the intervals in the municipalities (see Appendix
B.2.3). Indeed, the average hazard rate computed for any given time interval (the dependent
variable in (6)) is usually computed with more accuracy when the number of unemployed workers
at risk is large. We also used other weighting schemes that yielded minor changes to the results.
The nal descriptive stage consists in regressing municipality e¤ects on aggregate explanatory





= Zj + j (7)
where Zj are municipality variables and j are random terms. As municipality xed e¤ects are
estimated in the previous stages, their exact value is not observed. Introducing these estimators
in equation (7), we obtain:
\ln (j) = Zj + j + j (8)
where j = \ln (j)   ln (j) is a sampling error. Equation (8) is estimated using weighted least
squares where the weight is the initial number of unemployed workers in the municipality (see
Appendix B.3). This weighting has two justications. As above, the sampling error decreases with
the number of unemployed workers. Second, weighting by the number of unemployed workers
can be justied if we assume that municipalities can be decomposed into smaller areas of xed
population in which exit from unemployment is subject to an idiosyncratic shock with variance 2
(but a¤ected in the same way by municipality variables). In this context, the aggregate random
term j at the municipality level in equation (7) is an average of the smaller areasidiosyncratic
shocks. We thus assume that the terms j have a variance of the form 2=Cj (0) where Cj (0) is
the initial number of unemployed workers in municipality j.
5 Results
We now comment the results of the empirical analysis whose estimation stages were described
in the previous section. We rst examine the estimated coe¢ cients of the individual explanatory
10Correcting small sampling biases by bootstrap or jackknife does not perform better (Horowitz, 1998).
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variables obtained using the stratied partial likelihood estimator (stage 1). We then describe the
spatial disparities in municipality survival functions obtained from the model. We nally turn to
the results concerning the municipality xed e¤ects (stage 2) and regress them on local variables
measuring residential segregation and job accessibility (stage 3).
5.1 Individual Determinants of Unemployment Durations
Table 3 reports the coe¢ cients estimated using SPLE for each type of exit (job and non-employment).
Remember that the e¤ects of individual variables should be interpreted as a¤ecting multiplicatively
the hazard rates (through the term exp(Xi) in (1)).
[Insert Table 3]
Results are as expected although the magnitude of the e¤ects of some variables is surprisingly
large. First, for both exits, younger people have shorter unemployment spells. Although negative
and signicant, the e¤ect of age is marginally decreasing (in absolute value) as evidenced by
the square term. Note that it is never positive in any reasonable age range. Second, women
exit signicantly more slowly to a job than men (around  18%) while their exit rate to non-
employment is much larger (around +35%). Similarly, having children (whatever their number)
decreases the exit rate to a job and increases the exit rate to non-employment. Being in a couple
signicantly increases exit rates both to a job and to non-employment.
The strongest e¤ects are for nationality. Africans and other non-European citizens have an
exit rate to a job that is between 45% and 66% lower than the French. In contrast, the e¤ect of
nationality variables on the hazard rate to non-employment is signicant only for North Africans
and the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is much lower than for exit to work.
Education variables also have a strong e¤ect. Overall, education a¤ects the exit rate to a job
more than the exit rate to non-employment. For instance, compared to a university degree, a basic
degree lowers the exit rate to a job by 59% while it decreases the exit rate to non-employment
by only42%. The shadow wage (i.e. the opportunity cost of time in non participation) is less
a¤ected by education than market wages.
We perform two specication checks. First, it is interesting to compare our results with the
results of the estimation of a standard Cox model where the baseline hazard function is restricted to
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be constant across municipalities. We use the same individual variables Xi as covariates to which
we add the third-stage municipality variables such as segregation indices and job accessibility
measures Zi. Under these assumptions, our three-stage procedure collapses into one stage only
and results are not robust to misspecication in the second and third stage of our procedure.
The estimated coe¢ cients of individual variables (and their standard errors) are very close to
those obtained using our estimation method (SPLE) in stage 1.11 The estimated coe¢ cients of
geographic variables are also quite close to what we will obtain in stage 3 (see below). Nevertheless,
the standard errors of the estimated coe¢ cients of aggregate variables obtained with a standard
Cox model are at least one-third smaller than those obtained in our third-stage estimation. There
are two explanations for this di¤erence. First, the standard Cox model does not account for
aggregate unobserved e¤ects whereas our estimation method does. It is widely known that this
can lead to very biased standard errors (see Moulton, 1990). Second, there can be an e¢ ciency
loss when using our three stage approach since we are not estimating all equations at the same
time.
As a second specication check, we compare the Kaplan Meyer estimates of the survival func-
tion until an exit to a job with the estimates derived in our model for each municipality.12 We
use a Kolmogorov statistic as developed in Andrews (1997). The di¢ culty in the procedure 
as detailed in Appendix B.1 is the estimation of the variance of the test statistic evaluated by
bootstrap. The results show that our model provides a very good t at the municipality level. In
Graph 5 we report the empirical frequency across municipalities of the p-values associated with the
null hypothesis of a good t. The empirical frequency of municipalities in which we reject a good
t is indeed lower than the level of the test. It shows that we are able to describe unemployment
durations at the municipality level in a very satisfactory way. This justies our specication and,
in particular, our choice of not modeling unobserved heterogeneity.
[Insert Graph 5]
11Complete results are available upon request.
12We are thankful to a referee for this suggestion.
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5.2 Describing spatial disparities in unemployment duration
We now assess the magnitude of spatial disparities in unemployment duration until nding a job or
leaving to non-employment once the e¤ect of individual variables has been controlled for. This is
done by looking at the disparities between the municipality survival functions at 24 months. These
functions are computed from the Breslow estimator where all individual variables are centered,
substracting the corresponding mean in the whole region. Thus, these functions can be interpreted
as the municipality survival functions of an averageunemployed worker.
5.2.1 Comparing the Explanatory Power of Individual and Spatial E¤ects
We also want to assess the relative importance of individual characteristics and that of spatial
e¤ects in explaining the spatial disparities of unemployment durations. To do that, we resort to
two complementary approaches.
First, a direct approach is to compare indices of spatial disparities obtained from the Kaplan-
Meier estimators and from our model. While Kaplan-Meier estimators represent the raw data and
do not control for observed individual determinants of durations, the survival functions obtained
from the model (as computed from the integrated hazard functions in equation (4)) do control
for individual determinants. In Table 4, we report various disparity indices (inter-decile range
and ratio, Gini index and coe¢ cient of variation) of the survival functions after 6 and 24 months
both for Kaplan-Meier and for the model. For exits to a job, we nd that individual variables
explain only around 24% of spatial disparities at 6 months and around 15% at 24 months. To see
how this is calculated, consider for instance that the inter-decile ratio at 24 months is 1:503 for
the Kaplan-Meier estimate, and 1:426 for the survival function from the model. A coe¢ cient of
determination could thus be dened as (:503   :426)=:503, which is equal to 15:3%. This shows
that even after controling for the characteristics of local unemployed workers, spatial disparities
in nding a job remain large. This is a common theme in the literature (see Maurin, 2004).
[Insert Table 4]
Note that the comparisons, which rely on the usual estimators of the survival functions, are only
heuristic. Indeed, they are not based on an analytical relationship between the Kaplan-Meier
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estimators and the e¤ect of individual variables and the municipality survival functions of the
model.
Our second approach to estimate the relative importance of the contributions of individual
and local characteristics to spatial disparities in unemployment durations does not make use of
the Kaplan-Meier estimator and has rmer analytical grounds. It is a variance analysis of the
average integrated hazard at the municipality level. To see why such an analysis is feasible, write
the log-integrated hazard of a given individual i as the sum of the e¤ect of individual observed
characteristics Xi and the logarithm of the municipality integrated hazard j(i) (t) and a random
term  i:
ln  (t jXi; j (i)) = Xi + lnj(i) (t) +  i: (9)
Here,  i is the intrinsic randomness in durations and exp( i) is exponential(1) distributed (Lan-
caster, 1990). When we take the expectation of this equation in the population of unemployed
workers in a given municipality j, we obtain the following decomposition of the log-integrated
hazard of that municipality:
E(ln (t jXi; j ) j i 2 
j (0)) = Xj + lnj (t) + c0 (10)
where 
j (0) is the population of unemployed workers in the municipality, where Xj is the expec-
tation of individual characteristics in that population and where the constant c0 is the expectation
of  i.
13 In practice, the two right-hand side terms can be consistently estimated via the rst stage
estimations and their sum yields an estimate of the left-hand side term up to the constant term,
c0.
In Table 5, we report the results of a variance analysis across municipalities using equation (10)
for durations of various lengths: short (6 months), intermediate (12 months) and long (24 months).
Averages of individual observable characteristics explain around 30% of spatial e¤ects in job exits.
This confers to individual variables slightly more explanatory power than what we obtained in
Table 4, although it remains quite low. For instance at 12 months, the spatial variance of the
log-integrated hazard is equal to :0508 while the spatial variance of the average log-integrated
hazard in the municipality (LHS of (10)) is :0755. A pseudo-coe¢ cient of determination is thus
13As exp(i) is exponential(1) distributed, c0 = 1:
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(:0755  :0508)=:0755, which is equal to 33%.
[Insert Table 5]
5.2.2 Spatial Sorting and Spatial E¤ects
To understand what the remaining spatial disparities capture, it is useful to rewrite equation (10)
by decomposing the log municipality integrated hazard function into linear components at time t:
lnj (t) = ln (t) + Zj(t) + j(t) + E("i j j) (11)
where (t) is the integrated baseline hazard, Zj are observed municipality characteristics whose
coe¢ cients vary with time and j(t) are unobserved municipality e¤ects due to geographic features
such as infrastructures. The last term E("i j j) stands for spatial sorting of individuals into di¤er-
ent municipalities. Indeed, the expectation of individual unobserved heterogeneity in the ability of
exiting unemployment varies across municipalities because individuals might sort themselves into
municipalities, partly because of omitted factors included in the unobserved heterogeneity term.14
After controlling for individual observed characteristics, (11) shows that the remaining spatial
disparities can be due not only to local characteristics (observed or not) but also to variations
in the local average of individual unobserved characteristics. The lack of identication of these
di¤erent e¤ects is one form of the so-called reection problem of Manski (1993).
5.2.3 The correlation between spatial and individual e¤ects
Returning to the analysis of equation (10), it is also meaningful to calculate the correlations be-
tween the municipality composition e¤ects (Xj) and the logarithm of the municipality integrated
hazard (lnj (t)) at 6, 12 and 24 months. This correlation can be interpreted in three ways. It
can reect some sorting on observable municipality e¤ects (Zj(t)), some sorting on unobserv-
able municipality characteristics (j(t)), or a correlation between the local average of individual
observed variables and the local average of individual unobserved variables (E("i j j)).
Correlations are shown in Table 5. For exits to jobs, the correlation between the municipality
composition e¤ects and the municipality integrated hazard is high (for instance :49 at 12 months),
14The relationship between "i and the already dened i is i = "i   E("i j j).
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whereas, for exits to non-employment, it is very small ( :05 at 12 months). In order to assess
the robustness of these ndings, Graph 6 plots, for exits to jobs, the locally aggregated predictor
Xj as a function of the logarithm of the municipality integrated hazard lnj at 24 months for
municipalities with more than 10,000 inhabitants. The positive association between these variables
appears from these plots. It means that individual and local variables reinforce each other when
a¤ecting unemployment exits.
[Insert Graph 6]
Using equation (11), this correlation can be interpreted in three ways due to sorting. First,
unemployed workers who are less likely to nd a job because of their observable characteristics
could sort in municipalities with bad observable neighborhood attributes (for instance where
there are many foreigners, as these neighborhoods could be redlined by xenophobic employers).
Second, they could also sort themselves in municipalities with bad unobservable attributes (for
instance in municipalities which have a bad reputation among employers for some unobserved
reason). Third, municipality aggregate of observed and unobserved individual characterics could
be positively correlated (for instance workers with no diploma may be less e¢ cient in job-search).
In our opinion, one of the main result of this paper is thus to show that disparities in individual
characteristics are reinforced by disparities in local characteristics due to residential sorting.
Finally, we investigate whether places that enhance job nding do slow down the exit to non-
employment. To do that, we compute the correlations between the municipality integrated hazards
for nding a job and for exit to non-employment at 6, 12 and 24 months (weighing by the number
of unemployed workers at risk). We nd that for short and medium horizons (6 and 12 months),
there is little correlation between the two types of local e¤ects (resp.  :028 and :033). However,
in the long run (24 months), the correlation is positive and stands at :176. In municipalities where
job exits are more likely to occur, exits to non-employment are also more likely to take place at
least in the long run. This result can be understood by comparing reservation wages, shadow
wages and job o¤ers. In this framework, unemployed workers exit to non employment when their
reservation wage falls below their shadow wage. Our result suggests that this is more likely to
happen in the long run in municipalities where unemployed workers are more likely to exit to a
job. This could happen if municipalities where residents can easily nd a job are also those where
holding a job is more likely. Spouses could thus more likely become non participant because their
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opportunity cost of time increases with their spouses income.
5.3 Municipality E¤ects and Spatial Characteristics
5.3.1 Multiplicative Component Model
As explained above, we further restrict the hazard function and consider a multiplicative munic-
ipality hazard specied as the product of a municipality e¤ect and an aggregate baseline hazard
(see Equation (5)). To implement this approach, we divide the time line into M = 9 intervals,
with the rst eight intervals lasting 90 days and the remaining one lasting the rest of the pe-
riod. To assess whether the multiplicative specication is too restrictive, we compare the value of
disparity indices obtained with the unspecied municipality hazard with those obtained with the
multiplicative hazard (see Table 4 and Table 5). We nd that the multiplicative hazard reproduces
well spatial disparities for nding a job although it performs poorly for exit to non-employment
at 6 months (though not for the Gini). This good t justies the use of municipality e¤ects as an
adequate summary to study the determinants of spatial disparities for nding a job.
In line with the theories presented in Section 2, we investigate howmunicipality xed e¤ects can
be explained by segregation and job accessibility. Segregation is measured here by the composition
of the municipality population by education and by nationality. Job accessibility is measured by
local job density (as dened in Section 3.2).
5.3.2 Partial Correlations with Spatial Caracteristics
Table 6 reports various regressions of municipality e¤ects on those spatial characteristics. We com-
puted a pseudo-R2 to assess the explanatory power of the model taking into account the sampling
error (see Appendix B.3). When using only segregation indices as explanatory variables (column
1), we are able to explain 72:4% of the variance of municipality xed e¤ects. Job accessibility
indices (column 2) have a much lower explanatory power since the pseudo R2 is only 25:9%. This
suggests that spatial disparities in nding a job are more strongly associated with di¤erences in
the local level of segregation than with variations in job accessibility. When using both segregation
and job accessibility indices (column 3), the pseudo R2 reaches 73:0%.
We now comment on the coe¢ cient of the latter regression (column 3). Large municipality
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e¤ects in nding a job are associated with a large proportion of unskilled workers and of non-
French citizens (especially citizens from sub-Saharan Africa). This is consistent with the existence
of redlining (according to nationality and skill) as well as with a social network e¤ect. Munici-
pality e¤ects in nding a job are also correlated with local job accessibility, especially by private
transport, but the coe¢ cients of both private and public job accessibility measures are negative
in contradiction with the spatial mismatch theory.
[Insert Table 6]
Of course, there are some other interpretations of the results which are based on possible
omitted local variables, reverse causality or sorting on individual unobservables. There can be
omitted local variables correlated with segregation or job-accessibility measures. Our surprising
result for job accessibility could be explained if the job density indices captured the low quality
and high congestion of transports for instance.
Reverse causality can occur if local unemployment acts as an attraction or a repulsion force on
population and jobs. This could a¤ect the job accessibility measure and the segregation indices
(provided that the population categories are di¤erentially attracted or repulsed). To take the
example of segregation for instance, French people may ee municipalities where unemployment
exits to a job are more di¢ cult. This would increase the local proportion of foreigners, especially
Africans and could explain the negati coe¢ cient of the municipality proportion of Africans on
nding a job.
Municipality explanatory variables can capture the local average of individual unobserved vari-
ables if there is a correlation between Zj and the omitted term E("i j j) as dened in equation
(11) above. This is the case for instance when individuals with a given unobserved attribute (such
as motivation to search for a job) choose their location depending on observable municipality
variables (attractive residential neighborhoods where jobs are not easily accessible). This may
explain the negative e¤ect of the job accessibility index by private transport.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we study the spatial disparities in exits from unemployment across municipalities
in the Paris region. We use a unique and exhaustive administrative dataset which contains all
registered unemployment spells over the 1996-2003 period. This dataset contains some individual
characteristics of unemployed workers as well as their residential location. It is merged with spatial
indices of segregation and job accessibility computed from the census and a transport survey.
Our methodology is based on the estimation of independent competing risk duration models with
two exits (nding a job and dropping out of the labor force). We constructed measures of raw
spatial disparities across municipalities from the local survival functions after 24 months. We
nd that there are very large disparities. The local composition of workerscharacteristics can
explain around 30% of the disparities in nding a job. Our local indices (especially residential
segregation measures) capture nearly 70% of the remaining di¤erences. Furthermore, we showed
that disparities in individual characteristics are reinforced by disparities in local characteristics
due to residential sorting. The latter nding lends credit to the idea that spatial factors exacerbate
non spatial factors in the determination of unemployment, or that the most fragile unemployed
workers tend to cumulate local and invididual disadvantages.
Our work nevertheless considered broad local e¤ects related to segregation and job accessibility
without trying to investigate and disentangle the specic mechanisms at work, which could be
the basis for furture research. Another extension of this work could be to compute municipality
survival functions by nationality group or class of diploma. This would enable us to assess the
extent to which the e¤ect of local factors may di¤er for these groups. It would also be interesting
to study spatial disparities at a much ner scale were the data available. Indeed, our accessibility
measures are only at the municipality level whereas accessibility can di¤er even between two small
neighborhoods (e.g. when they are separated by a railroad). Working at a ner geographic scale
may also allow for an investigation of other important issues such as the role of spatialized social
networks, which are likely to occur within a limited geographic area (see Bayer, Ross and Topa,
2008; Gobillon and Selod, 2007).
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A Data Appendix
Over the 1993-2003 period, the panel contains 10,290,225 unemployment spells. We selected
unemployment spells beginning between January 1 and June 30, 1996 which form a subsample
of 451,191 unemployment spells. By keeping observations corresponding to unemployed workers
between 16 and 54 years old only, we ended up with a dataset comprising 433,802 unemployment
spells. After deleting observations with missing values and coding problems, the nal sample is
composed of 430,695 observations. Descriptive statistics about variables in our nal dataset are
given in Table A1.
B Computational details
B.1 First-stage estimation
We want to test for each municipality that the empirical survival function as estimated by Kaplan
Meier estimation is equal to the survival function predicted by the model.
B.1.1 Construction of the Kolmogorov test statistic
Let S(t; k) be the survival function of the data for exit k and let S(t; k j x; ) be the conditional
survival function of the model. Here,  denotes parameters k and the municipality baseline
hazard. The null hypothesis writes:
H0 : S(t; k) =
Z
S(t; k j x; )dF (x)
where dF (x) is the probability measure of covariates. This is an adaptation of Andrews (1997)
with some di¤erences since the latter paper considers null hypotheses of the form:
H0 : S(t; k jx)F (x) = S(t; k jx;  )F (x) a.s. F (x):
where S(t; k jx) is the conditional survival function of the data. The adaptation of the proofs of
Andrews (1997) are out of the scope of this paper.
Our sample consists in individuals, i = 1; :::; N , of characteristics Xi for whom we observe
unemploment duration ti and type of exit. We restrict our attention to exits to job and we drop
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index k from the survival functions. Computing the test statistic for exits to non-employment
follows the same principles.
Let H^jN(t) be the Kaplan Meier estimator of the survival function of duration t in municipality







Si(t j Xi; ^);
where Nj denotes the number of individuals in municipality j, and where ^ denotes the SPLE
estimator and the functional Breslow estimator of the baseline hazard rate. The conditional






In practice, we trim out durations in the last percentile when computing our test statistic. This
is because the survival functions are not estimated with accuracy at that percentile and the test
statistic takes articially large values at nite distance.
Alternatively, we could also consider another statistic which is the mean square di¤erence of









where Nj is the number of unemployed workers in municipality j.
For these two test statistics, we need to compute the distribution under the null hypothesis.
We proceed by bootstrap as proposed by Andrews (1997).
B.1.2 Computation of the distribution of the test statistic.
We now explain how to compute the distribution of the test statistic for a given municipality. We
drop index j for simplicity. For an individual i having a censored unemployment spell, the duration
before censorship, tic = ti, is an exogenous characteristic of the individual. If the unemployment
spell is not censored, censorship is not relevant and its duration is not taken into account. We
denote eXi the exogenous information i.e. eXi = (Xi; tic) for censored individuals and eXi = (Xi; )
for uncensored ones.
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The asymptotic distribution of Andrewstest statistic is computed by (semi)-parametric boot-
strap for B replications, b = 1; :::; B. For each replication, we generate a duration for each
individual using the proportional hazard model. The data are generated conditionally on the ex-
ogenous characteristics eXi, the estimated parameters for exit to job be and the Breslow estimator.
The procedure to simulate durations is the following.
For an individual i, the integrated hazard for exit to job at duration t writes:
 (t jXi ) =  (t) exp (Xie)





lnS (t jXi )
To obtain simulated durations, we draw the value of the survival function in a uniform distribution





There remains to invert function b at point bbi to recover duration etbi for individual i. In practice,bbi increases piecewise and there is a duration at which the function b makes a jump from bi to

b
i such that 
b
i 6 bbi < bi . We dene etbi as the duration at which function b makes this jump.
A practical issue is that b cannot be computed above the upper bound b (tmax), where tmaxj
is the largest duration in the sample. If a simulated value is such that bbi > b (tmax), we set
duration to etbi = tmax. This small sample bias should disappear asymptotically when the number
of individuals in each municipality tends to innity.
For individuals who were not censored, the generated duration is tbi = etbi . For individuals who
were right-censored, the generated duration is tbi = min
 etbi ; tic. The generated exit is nding a
job if etbi < tic, and it is censorship if etbi > tic. We then construct the Kaplan-Meiers estimator
denoted H^j;bN (t). For individual i, we compute the value of the Kaplan-Meiers estimator of his






. In the same way, we use the Breslows
estimator of any municipality j to construct a survival function which is denoted S^j;bN (t). For
individual i, we compute the value of the survival function of his municipality at the generated













H^bi   S^bi 
As previously, we trim out durations in the last percentile when computing our test statistic. B






1fCKjN > CKj;bN g:
B.2 Second-stage estimation
B.2.1 Finite-sample issues
We rst explain how we take into account nite sample issues when establishing equation (6). For
that purpose, we rened appropriatly the quantities involved in (6). We divide the period into
M intervals [tm 1; tm], m = 1; :::;M . We denote m = 1tm tm 1
tmR
tm 1
 (s) ds the average baseline
hazard over the interval m and djm =
tmR
tm 1
I (Cj (s) > 0) ds the length of time within interval m
when some individuals in municipality j are at risk. In particular, djm < tm  tm 1 in the last time
interval in which there are some unemployed workers at risk in municipality j. The average hazard




[j (tm) j (tm 1)]. An estimator of this average hazard rate can be constructed from
equation (4) and writes: y^jm =
1
djm
[bj (tm)  bj (tm 1)]. We can then re-establish formula (6) where
the quantities have been redened.
B.2.2 Covariance matrix of the sampling errors
We now give the formulas to compute the covariance matrix of ("jm)j;m ;which are the sampling
errors in equation (6), using Ridder and Tunalis appendix (RT hereafter). We rst introduce the
following notations that will be used below:












j (s) is the set of unemployed workers still at risk in municipality j at time s. Note
that whereas S0j (; s) is a 1  1 matrix, S1j (; s) is a 1  K matrix, where K is the number
of explanatory variables in the rst stage. We also denote Cj (s) = card 
j (s) the number of
unemployed workers still at risk in municipality j at time s. According to RT (A28), we have:



















dN j (s)  j (s) ds
i
(RT A22)
cjm =   1djm
tmZ
tm 1









where  is a value between  and b (coming from a Taylor expansion not detailed here), dN j (s)
is a dummy that equals one if someone in municipality j experiences an exit in an arbitrarily
short period of time before date s (and zero otherwise), and djm =
tmR
tm 1
I (Cj (s) > 0) ds. Here, 
is uncorrelated with jm. From equation (12), it is possible to get:




jmV cjm (RT A29)
cov
 




= c0jmV ckn for j 6= k or m 6= n (RT A30)
where V = V
b. These covariance-matrix terms of (exp "jm)j;m can be estimated computing
estimators of all terms on the right-hand sides. An estimator of V is obtained from the Fisher
information matrix of SPLE. In practice, there is no need to have the theoretical formula to get
this estimator as it is directly recovered from the estimation software. Some estimators of V (jm)
and cjm are:
bV (jm) = 1(djm)2
tmZ
tm 1
I (Cj (s) > 0) 1
[S0j (b;s)]2dN j (s) (from RT A25)
bcjm =   1djm
tmZ
tm 1
I (Cj (s) > 0)
S1j (b;s)
[S0j (b;s)]2dN j (s) (from RT A27)
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These estimators have to be programmed to be computed. From the covariance matrix of
(exp "jm)j;m, we get the covariance matrix of ("
j
m)j;m using the delta method.
B.2.3 Estimation
Formulas
We rst give some notations we use in this section. Denote J the number of municipalities andM
the number of time intervals. For any JM 1 matrix X, Xj refers to theM 1 matrix dened by
X(j 1)M+[1:M ];1. For any given JM  JM matrix X, Xj;k refers to the M M submatrix dened
by X(j 1)M+[1:M ];(k 1)M+[1:M ] where [1 :M ] is the vector of integers from 1 to M .
The equation to estimate is (6) where we x 1 = 1 to secure identication. We stack the obser-
vations of (6) and obtain:
Y = A+G + " (13)
where A is a JM  J matrix such that A(j 1)M+m;k = 1 if j = k and A(j 1)M+m;k = 0 otherwise,
G is a JM  (M   1) matrix such that G(j 1)M+m;l = 1 if m = l and A(j 1)M+m;l = 0 otherwise,
Y =
 










are some JM  1 vectors,  = (ln1; :::; lnJ)0 is a
J  1 vector and  = (ln 2; :::; ln M)0 is a (M   1) 1 vector.
Denote  = diag (N11; :::; NJM) the JM  JM diagonal matrix where Njm is the number of
unemployed workers in municipality j still at risk at the beginning of interval m. After weighting
equation (13) with 1=2, it becomes:
1=2Y = 1=2A+1=2G +1=2"
Denote W the projector in the dimension orthogonal to 1=2A. Using the rst stage of Frisch-
Waugh theorem, we obtain the WLS estimator of :
b = (G01=2W1=2G) 1G01=2W1=2Y
=  + (G01=2W1=2G) 1G01=2W1=2" (14)
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The second stage of the Frisch-Waugh theorem gives the WLS estimator of :
b = (A0A) 1A0 hY  Gbi
= (A0A) 1A0
h




Denote   = A0A,  = G01=2W1=2G and 	 = G01=2W1=2V1=2W1=2G, where V = V (").
We have:
V
b =  1	 1 (15)
Also, we get:
V (b) =   1A0VA  1
+  1A0GV
bG0A  1 (16)





































  = diag [tr (1;1) ; :::; tr (J;J)]
where for any given variable Zj of dimensionM1, Zj is its counterpart centered with its weighted










where Nj = (Nj;1; :::; Nj;M)
0 and Nj  = (Nj;2; :::; Nj;M)
0.
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Moreover, V1=2W1=2 = V where V is dened such that any of its given submatrix V j;k writes:






 the Kronecker product and 1M a M  1 matrix lled







































The third-stage equation to estimate is given by (8). When we stack the observations, we obtain:
b = Z +  +  (17)
where b = [ln1; :::;[lnJ0,  = (1; :::; J)0 and  = (1; :::; J)0 are some J  1 vectors, and
Z = (Z 01; :::; Z
0
J)
0 is a J  K matrix. We suppose that  j1;:::;J have a covariance matrix 2Q 1
where Q = diag(N11; :::; NJ1). Equation (17) is estimated with weighted least squares where the
weights are the square-roots of the numbers of unemployed workers at the initial date (Q1=2). The
estimated coe¢ cients write: b = (Z 0QZ) 1 Z 0Qb
and their covariance matrix is:
V (b) = (Z 0QZ) 1 Z 0Q V () + 2Q 1QZ (Z 0QZ) 1
= (Z 0QZ) 1 Z 0QV ()QZ (Z 0QZ) 1 + 2 (Z 0QZ) 1
It is possible to construct a consistent estimator of 2 using the residuals [ +  = Q1=2b Q1=2Zb.
This estimator is found from the following calculation sequence:
[ + 
0[ +  = ( + )0
h








where we made the approximation (for N large enough) that:
[ + 







 2J + tr [QV ()]
when V () has been computed from the rst-stage estimation. An estimator of 2 can then be
dened as: b2 = h[ + 0[ +    tr [QV ()]i =J





We also construct a pseudo-R2 dened as:
R2p =
V eQ (Zb)
V eQ (Zb) + b2J
where V eQ () =
 
Zb   Zb0Q  Zb   Zb =tr (Q) is the empirical variance obtained when weighting
observations with weights Q (where Z = tr (QZ) =trQ). Note that when there is no sampling error,




[1] Altonji J.G. and L.M. Segal (1996), Small Sample Bias in GMM estimation of Covariance
Structures, Journal of Business & Economic Statistics, 14(3), 353-65.
[2] Andrews D. (1997), A Conditional Kolmogorov test, Econometrica, 65(5), 1097-1128
[3] Baccaini B., Courgeau D. and G. Desplanques (1993), Les migrations internes en France de
1982 à 1990. Comparaison avec les périodes antérieures, 48(6), 1771-89.
[4] Baker M. and A. Melino (2000), Duration Dependence and Non-Parametric Heterogeneity:
A Monte-Carlo Study, Journal of Econometrics, 96, 357-93.
[5] Bayer P., Ross S. and G. Topa (2008), Place of Work and Place of Residence: Informal Hiring
Networks and Labor Market Outcomes, Journal of Political Economy, 116(6), 1150-96.
[6] Breslow N.E. (1974), Covariance Analysis of Censored Survival Data, Biometrics, 30, pp.
89-99.
[7] Calvo-Armengol A. and M. Jackson (2004), Social networks in determining unemployment:
Patterns, dynamics and inequality, American Economic Review, 94, 191-206.
[8] Chardon O. and D. Goux (2003), The new european denition of BIT unemployment(in
French), Economie et Statistiques, 362, 67-83.
[9] Conley T. and G. Topa (2002), Socio-economic distance and spatial patterns in unemploy-
ment, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 17(4), 303-327.
[10] Cutler D. and E. Glaeser (1997), Are Ghettos Good or Bad?, Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics, 112, 827-872.
[11] Dawkins C., Shen Q. and T. Sanchez (2005), Race, Space and Unemployment Duration,
Journal of Urban Economics, 58, 91-113.
38
[12] DREIF (Direction Régionale de lEquipement Ile-de-France) / INSEE Ile-de-France (1997),
Daily moves: Ile-de-France population more mobile(in French), 2 pages.
[13] Gobillon L. and H. Selod (2007), The e¤ect of segregation and spatial mismatch: evidence
from France, CEPR Working Paper 6198.
[14] Gobillon L., Selod H. and Y. Zenou (2007), The mechanisms of spatial mismatch, Urban
Studies, 44 (12), 2401-27 .
[15] Gouriéroux C., A. Monfort, E. Renault and A. Trognon (1985), Asymptotic Least Squares
(in French), Annales de lINSEE, 58, 91-122.
[16] Holzer H. and K. Ihlanfeldt (1998) Customer discrimination and employment outcomes for
minority workers, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113, 835-867.
[17] Holzer H., Ihlanfeldt K. and D. Sjoquist (1994), Work, search and travel among white and
black youth, Journal of Urban Economics, 35, 320-345.
[18] Horowitz J., (1998), Bootstrap Methods for Covariance Structures, Journal of Human
Resources, 33, 39-61.
[19] Ihlanfeldt K. (1993), Intra-urban job accessibility and Hispanic youth employment rate,
Journal of Urban Economics, 33, 254-271.
[20] Ihlanfeldt K. (1997), Information on the spatial distribution of job opportunities within
Metropolitan Areas, Journal of Urban Economics, 41, 218-242.
[21] Ihlanfeldt K. and D. Sjoquist (1998), The spatial mismatch hypothesis: a review of recent
studies and their implications for welfare reform, Housing Policy Debate, 9, 849-892.
[22] Johnson R. (2006) Landing a job in urban space: the extent and e¤ects of spatial mismatch,
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36, 331-72.
[23] Lancaster T. (1990), The Econometric Analysis of Transition Data, Cambridge University
Press: Cambridge.
39
[24] Manski C. F. (1993), Identication of Endogenous Social E¤ects: The Reection Problem,
Review of Economic Studies, 60(3), 531-42.
[25] Maurin E. (2004), The French Ghetto (in French), ed. Seuil, 95p.
[26] Moulton B.R. (1990), An Illustration of Pitfalls in estimating the E¤ects of Aggregate vari-
ables on Micro Units, Review of Economics and Statistics, 72, 334-8.
[27] Mortensen D. et T. Vishwanath (1994), Personal contacts and earnings. It is who you know!,
Labour Economics, 1, 187-201.
[28] Patacchini E. Y. Zenou (2006), Search activities, cost of living, and local labor markets,
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 36(2), 227-48.
[29] Ridder G. and I. Tunali (1999), Stratied partial likelihood estimation, Journal of Econo-
metrics, 92(2), 193-232.
[30] Rogers C. (1997), Job Search and Unemployment Duration: Implications for the Spatial
Mismatch Hypothesis, Journal of Urban Economics, 42, 109-32.
[31] Selod H. and Y. Zenou (2006), City structure, job search, and labor discrimination. Theory
and policy implications, Economic Journal, 116, 1057-87.
[32] Smith T. and Y. Zenou (2003), Spatial mismatch, search e¤ort and urban spatial structure,
Journal of Urban Economics, 54, 129-156.
[33] Stoll M. (1999), Spatial job search, spatial mismatch, and the employment and wages of
racial and ethnic groups in Los Angeles, Journal of Urban Economics, 46, 129-55.
[34] Stoll M. and S. Raphael (2000), Racial di¤erences in spatial job search patterns: Exploring
the causes and consequences, Economic Geography, 201-223.
[35] Weinberg B. (2000), Black residential centralization and the spatial mismatch hypothesis,
Journal of Urban Economics, 48, 110-134.
[36] Weinberg B. (2004), Testing the spatial mismatch hypothesis using inter-city variations in
industrial composition, Regional Science and Urban Economics, 34, 505-32.
40
[37] Wilson,J. (1996), When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor, New York:
Alfred A. Knopf.
[38] Zax J. and J. Kain (1996), Moving to the suburbs: Do relocating companies leave their
Black employees behind?, Journal of Labor Economics, 14, 472-504.
[39] Zenou Y. (2002), How do rms redline workers?, Journal of Public Economics, 52(3), pages
391-408.
41
Graph 1: Population density (per sq km) in the Paris region in 1999 
 
less than 100 
100 to 1,500 
1,500 to 5,000 
5,000 to 10,000 
over 10,000 
Source: constructed from the 1999 Population Census, INSEE. The geographical unit is the subdistrict for the city of Paris or the 
municipality for the rest of the region. Bold lines represent the boundaries of the city of Paris (the turtle-shaped area in the middle of the 
map) and of the seven surrounding subregional administrative districts (départements). 
 
 
Graph 2: Unemployment rates in the Paris region in 1999 
 
less than 5% 
5 – 10% 
10 – 15% 
15 – 20% 
above 20% 
Source: constructed from the 1999 Population Census, INSEE. 
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Graph 3: probability of finding a job before 24 months (Kaplan-Meier) 
for municipalities with at least 5,000 inhabitants 
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50% – 55% 
40% – 50% 
30% – 40% 
Source: constructed from the ANPE file. 
 
Graph 4: probability of leaving for non-employment before 24 months 
(Kaplan-Meier) for municipalities with at least 5,000 inhabitants 
 
45% – 55% 
40% – 45% 
30% – 40% 
25% – 30% 
15% – 25% 
Source: constructed from the ANPE file. 
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Source: constructed from the ANPE file. 
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Graph 6: Municipality average of individual effects Xjβ 
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  Source: constructed from the ANPE file. 




Table 1: Spatial inequality indices for measures of segregation and job accessibility 
calculated using census data 
 
 












Segregation variables       
Unemployment rate .116 2.408 .100 .196 .355 1300 
% French .813 1.277 .198 .054 .095 1300 
% European (other) .070 2.080 .050 .160 .294 1300 
% North African .054 9.464 .097 .396 .730 1300 
% Sub-Saharan African .026 9.371 .046 .389 .700 1300 
% Other Nationality .037 6.522 .057 .361 .688 1300 
% Secondary School Diploma .399 1.895 .248 .130 .227 1300 
% Technical diploma .192 2.526 .156 .175 .311 1300 
% High school Diploma .148 1.453 .054 .076 .137 1300 
% College Diploma .261 3.883 .333 .270 .479 1300 
Job-accessibility variables       
45mn job density by public transport 1.062 2.995 1.009 .211 .459 1300 
45mn job density by car .856 1.615 .400 .104 .181 1300 
Source: constructed from the 1999 Population Census and the 2000 General Transport Survey (Enquête Globale de Transport). The 
unemployment rate is weighted by the labor force. Nationality rates are weighted by the population. Diploma rates are computed for the 
population over 15 and are weighted by the population over 15. Job-accessibility variables are weighted by the labor force.  
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Exit types and unemployment spells       
% Exit to job .280 1.734 .152 .121 .224 1289 
% Exit to non-employment .167 1.370 .052 .070 .148 1289 
% Right-censoring .553 1.322 .152 .218 .426 1289 
Duration if exit to job 276 1.374 87 .070 .138 1254 
Duration if exit to non-employment 369 1.433 131 .083 .179 1156 
Duration if right-censoring 334 1.753 179 .130 .281 849 
Characteristics of unemployed workers       
% Age 32.610 1.080 2.499 .017 .032 1289 
% Male .518 1.164 .078 .033 .068 1289 
% Female .482 1.177 .078 .035 .073 1289 
% Single .606 1.327 .174 .062 .113 1289 
% Couple .394 1.599 .175 .095 .174 1289 
% 0 child .613 1.352 .185 .065 .116 1289 
% 1 child .163 1.458 .061 .085 .174 1289 
% 2 children .124 1.875 .074 .135 .264 1289 
% 3 children .057 2.814 .056 .212 .404 1289 
% 4 children .023 5.281 .032 .306 .569 1289 
% 5 children and more .019 6.938 .032 .378 .703 1289 
% French .782 1.315 .214 .060 .107 1289 
% European (other) .064 2.636 .061 .209 .402 1289 
% North African .077 5.444 .110 .305 .541 1289 
% Sub-Saharan African .045 5.665 .063 .303 .531 1289 
% Other Nationality .032 1.671 .051 .371 .695 1289 
% College diploma .239 3.942 .315 .285 .513 1289 
% High School (excluding final year) .165 1.636 .079 .106 .205 1289 
% High school (final year and diploma) 
and technical diploma .327 2.199 .231 .152 .272 1289 
% Secondary school .269 2.455 .226 .179 .314 1289 
% Disabled .033 2.631 .030 .195 .399 1289 
Source: constructed from the ANPE file, sample of workers whose unemployment spell started between January 1996 and June 1996. All 
indices are weighted by the number of unemployed workers.  
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 Table 3: Estimation results of the first-stage equation (SPLE) 
 
 
Variables Job Non-employment 


















No child <ref> <ref> 




















French <ref> <ref> 
















College diploma <ref> <ref> 

















Number of observations 430,695 
Source: constructed from the ANPE file. 
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. 
Monthly dummy variables were also included to control for seasonality but are not reported in the table. 
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Table 4: Disparity indices at the municipality level 
 








Until exit to job      
    Survival at 6 months      
        Kaplan-Meier .801 1.173 .127 .035 .065 
        Model .811 1.132 .100 .028 .053 
        Multiplicative model .811 1.135 .103 .027 .055 
      
     Survival at 24 months      
         Kaplan-Meier .533 1.503 .213 .088 .164 
         Model .537 1.426 .188 .076 .143 
         Multiplicative model .535 1.416 .185 .076 .142 
      
Until exit to non employment       
     Survival at 6 months      
         Kaplan-Meier .893 1.059 .051 .012 .027 
         Model .896 1.049 .043 .011 .024 
         Multiplicative model .894 1.068 .059 .011 .037 
      
     Survival at 24 months      
         Kaplan-Meier .681 1.200 .123 .039 .093 
         Model .686 1.175 .109 .036 .075 
         Multiplicative model .683 1.175 .110 .036 .087 
Source: constructed from the ANPE file. 
Fixed effects in the multiplicative model are computed using 8 intervals of 90 days and one interval covering the remaining days. 
Municipalities are weighted by the number of unemployed workers.  
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Table 5: Variance analysis at the municipality level 
 





Xjβ .0068 1 .0016 1 
     
lnHk6 .0750 .668 .0387 .127 
lnHm6 .0556 .468 .0381 -.081 
lnHm6+ Xjβ .0805 .679 .0385 .126 
lnHmm6 .0499 .437 .0309 -.030 
lnHmm6+ Xjβ .0728 .667 .0322 .197 
     
lnHk12 .0702 .693 .0358 .177 
lnHm12 .0508 .490 .0346 -.049 
lnHm12+ Xjβ .0757 .700 .0355 .167 
lnHmm12 .0449 .435 .0342 -.024 
lnHmm12+ Xjβ .0726 .666 .0355 .193 
     
lnHk24 .0602 .646 .0374 .149 
lnHm24 .0465 .387 .0372 -.087 
lnHm24+ Xjβ .0669 .639 .0375 .123 
lnHmm24 .0481 .435 .0340 .034 
lnHmm24+ Xjβ .0705 .668 .0352 .035 
Source: constructed from the ANPE file. 
Fixed effects in the multiplicative model are computed using 8 intervals of 90 days and one interval covering the remaining days. 
Xjβ: average effect of individual explanatory variables at the municipality level. lnHkT: log of integrated hazard at T days using the Kaplan-
Meyer estimator. lnHmT: log of integrated hazard at T days for the model. lnHmmT: log of integrated hazard at T days for the model under the 
multiplicative assumption. Statistics are computed weighting municipalities by their number of unemployed workers. 
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Table 6: Regressions of town fixed effects (for exit to job) on municipality variables 
 









































Job density within 45mins by 





Number of observation 1254 1254 1254 
Weighted number of observations 430602 430602 430602 
Error rate .468 .246 .473 
Pseudo-R² .724 .259 .730 
Source: constructed from the ANPE file. 
***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level. 
Estimates are computed using 8 intervals of 90 days and one interval covering the remaining days. Municipalities are weighted by the number 
of unemployed workers. 
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Exit types and unemployment spells      
Exit to job 430,695 .280 .449 .000 1.000 
Exit to non-employment 430,695 .167 .373 .000 1.000 
Right-censoring 430,695 .672 .470 .000 1.000 
Duration if exit to job 120,502 273 337 1 2818 
Duration if exit to non-employment   71,807 368 452 1 2813 
Duration if right-censoring 238,386 287 378 1 2829 
Characteristics of unemployed workers      
Age 430,695 32.610 9.222 16.000 54.000 
Male 430,695 .518 .500 .000 1.000 
Female 430,695 .482 .500 .000 1.000 
Single 430,695 .606 .489 .000 1.000 
Couple 430,695 .394 .489 .000 1.000 
0 child 430,695 .613 .487 .000 1.000 
1 child 430,695 .163 .369 .000 1.000 
2 children 430,695 .124 .330 .000 1.000 
3 children 430,695 .057 .233 .000 1.000 
4 children 430,695 .023 .150 .000 1.000 
5 children and more 430,695 .019 .137 .000 1.000 
French 430,695 .782 .413 .000 1.000 
European (other) 430,695 .064 .245 .000 1.000 
North African 430,695 .077 .267 .000 1.000 
Sub-Saharan African 430,695 .045 .207 .000 1.000 
Other Nationality 430,695 .032 .175 .000 1.000 
College diploma 430,695 .239 .427 .000 1.000 
High School (excluding final year) 430,695 .165 .371 .000 1.000 
High school (final year and diploma) 
and technical diploma 430,695 .327 .469 .000 1.000 
Secondary school 430,695 .269 .443 .000 1.000 
Disabled 430,695 .033 .178 .000 1.000 
Segregation variables      
Unemployment rate 430,695 .127 .043 .000 .246 
% French 430,695 .794 .078 .569 1.000 
% European (other) 430,695 .071 .020 .000 .265 
% North African 430,695 .064 .041 .000 .218 
% Sub-Saharan African 430,695 .030 .019 .000 .086 
% Other Nationality 430,695 .041 .027 .000 .230 
% No diploma 430,695 .412 .091 .202 .663 
% Technical diploma 430,695 .191 .057 .040 .402 
% High school 430,695 .145 .020 .000 .266 
% University 430,695 .252 .123 .030 .571 
Job-accessibility variables      
45mn job density by public transport 430,695 1.085 .436 .076 19.920 
45mn job density by car 430,695 .860 .152 .152 1.200 
Source: constructed from the ANPE file. 
 
